UNION
POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE
ET LE PROGRÈS SOCIAL
[Page principale] [Home page]
MEMORANDUM OF
THE UNION FOR DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS( UDPS) TO THE SPECIAL
ATTENTION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
In care of the delegation of the United Nations Security Council on
mission in DRC
THE PROBLEMATIC OF THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF CONGO "DRC"
1. The political and social
actors of the Democratic Republic of Congo negotiated and signed a
political agreement called the â?oGlobal and Inclusive Accord
" (GAI) in
Five major and indispensable objectives were assigned to this
transition as guideposts on the path before us leading to free,
democratic and thus credible, elections, in order to put an end to
the major and many sided crisis which has buffeted the DRC for
decades.
2. Throughout this period,
initially planned for 24 months, from June 30, 2003 to June 30,
2005, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, the UDPS, as
well as the active
forces of the country, in particular the religious confessions,
did not cease to sound the alarm on the bankrupt and chaotic way in
which the process of transition was conducted.
3. Today, 29 months since the
beginning of this process, all observers, Congolese or foreign, agree on
its failure due to problems of generalized bad governance,
generated by a lack of responsible leadership likely to impel
orientations necessary to the process, particularly in political,
legal, financial and security aspects.
Moreover, the electoral process in progress, which some
describe as irreversible, is, unfortunately, not credible but imposed by
outsiders in contempt of the will of the Congolese People.
Further, the incompetence of the Independent Electoral Commission
(ICE) is responsible for discrediting the work it was committed to
perform, characterized by:
â?¢ the faulty evaluation of tasks to be performed, resulting in
surprises and improvisations on the ground;
â?¢ the absence of a sequencing chart setting out the essential
path operations were to take, allowing corrections when necessary;
â?¢ a true lack of independence resulting in repeated
interference by those holding political power in the activities
and the management of ICE;
â?¢ the misuse of the funds placed at its disposal, involving
moving personnel intended for electoral operations and their use by
potential candidates of political parties of those in power for
enrollment in their strongholds.
â?¢ the absence of a census, even if only administrative, of the
population, needed to have reliable pre-electoral and electoral data.
Taking the preceding into consideration, the most representative
political and social forces have not taken part in such a process, which
exposes it already to post-electoral disputes.
4. It is for this reason,
vital to the future of the DRC, that the UDPS asks you today,
given the incomprehension displayed by certain external partners
which still officially accompany us in bringing this process to
the desired end, to give the DRC a chance by convening a dialogue
between the significant political and social forces with a view to
achieving a new national
political consensus meant to mark the path forward to the
completion of the transitional period.
5. This dialogue, of a maximum duration of 4 weeks (1
month), will have as tasks:
â?¢ To evaluate the extent of implementation of the 5 objectives
assigned to this transition as guideposts on the path before us leading
to free, democratic elections;
â?¢ To determine the time remaining necessary to accomplish each
one of these objectives;
â?¢ To work out an institutional architecture able to carry out
the tasks raised here without obstruction;
â?¢ To designate, in an inclusive way, political and social
actors qualified to animate this institutional architecture for
the peaceful completion of the transition.
7. The new national consensus
inclusive of significant political and social forces, which will emerge
from this dialogue, will rely principally on the following
particular issues, which are closely related to the success of the
transition, issues for which the UDPS offers outlines of solutions
in the attached appendices.
These issues are:
II. consensus on the principal constitutional options of the
3rd Republic,
III. the requalification of the electoral process, and
IV. respect for human rights.
ETIENNE TSHISEKEDI wa MULUMBA
NATIONAL PRESIDENT
ANNEXE I [I]
ON POLITICAL READJUSTMENT
A. Finding
It is public knowledge that, according to the objectives assigned to the
transition (the principal mission of which was the organization of free,
democratic and transparent elections in a period of 24 months), the
institutions issued from the Global and Inclusive Accord (GAI) have
failed.
The principal causes of this failure are:
1. The disfunctional character of the 1+4 formula implemented by 1
President of the Republic and 4 Vice-Presidents, irremovable and all
issuing from the ranks of the old belligerent factions;
2. The lack of political will on the part of the leader of the
transition actors who has purposefully wasted time in a ballad of
parochial quarrels;
3. Amateurism and absence of responsible leadership capable of
giving direction to the conduct of affairs of state;
4. The rupture of the consensus born of the GAI following the
exclusion from the management of the transition of the most
representative social and political forces of our country;
5. The inversion of priorities, such as the need for defense and
security inverted in favor
of the sharing of power to in order to line pockets;
6. the logic of automatic prolongation in order to maintain power.
The Congolese population has expressed itself many times to reject the
1+4 formula and to reject the automatic prolongation of the transition
as decided in
In addition, this rejection is also seen in targeted attacks on
symbols of the Independent Electoral Commission (ICE) through all
the country.
Finally, social discontent reaches all socio-professional strata
of the country to the extent that there remains not a shadow of
doubt that a crisis of confidence exists between the current leaders
and the population.
B. Proposal
In order to, on one hand, assure the organization and the holding of
elections in a peaceful socio-political environment, and on the other to
avoid a forced landing of the transition and to give credit and the
necessary legitimacy to the results which will emerge from the vote with
the participation of everyone, the UDPS proposes the convening of a
dialogue between the significant political and social forces which will
articulate a new national consensus.
The new national consensus that will emerge from it will have the
advantage:
a) to be representative of the principal political forces of the
country;
b) to cement national reconciliation through the participation of
all in the management of the transition;
c) to institute good governance and to assure the equitable
repartition of the national revenue between all social strata;
d) to apply a political will capable of accelerating the
organization, in a reasonable time frame, of free, democratic and
transparent elections.
ANNEX II
CONSENSUS ON THE PRINCIPAL CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS
OF THE 3RD REPUBLIC
A. Finding
For the majority of the Congolese people, the project of the
constitution that is in the process of being imposed by popular sanction
has not taken into account the realities of our country but also has not
learned the lessons of the past.
Its drafters superbly ignored that in 1964, by a free, popular,
democratic and transparent referendum, the people expressed themselves
unequivocally on this matter.
Later, on the occasion of the Sovereign National Conference, not only
were the 1964 options reaffirmed, but further, the project of the
constitution elaborated by this forum was rid of all ambiguity that
could favor conflicts over the competencies between institutions.
Unfortunately in a summary examination of the project in question
one easily detects the germs of such conflict, especially in the
executive power.
B. Proposal
UDPS proposes that a consensus on the principal options on the project
of the constitution of the 3rd Republic be reached before submitting it
to a referendum.
ANNEX III
THE REQUALIFICATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
The requalification of the ongoing electoral process in DR Congo must
address the following aims: the creation of a new neutral organizing
power which could come under the jurisdiction of the United Nations, the
correction of the process of identification and enrollment of voters by
the twin action of filtering the voter lists by a central server before
the required posting of them, on one hand, and the consolidation of the
definitive lists by an administrative census of the population, on the
other.
3.1 The new organizing authority
A. Finding
The Independent Electoral Commission has been disqualified for being
transformed into an echo chamber of the regime in power which has become
incapable of providing security for all as it has transpired, during its
two years of functioning with regard to, among others, the
following facts:
1. its politicization from the outset in its composition entirely
dominated by the ex-belligerents and
allies;
2. its partiality displayed, especially during the identification
operation and enrolment of electors, ten days from the end of
the transition without the census foreseen as a pre-condition by
the AGI and in the absence of the electoral law, with the sole
purpose of saving the regime in power to which it is
beholden;
3. the faking of enrolee totals, thus yielding fantasy
projections;
4. the discriminatory distribution of the inscription centres
leading to the exclusion of numerous parties from the national
territory;
5. its involvement in the numerous cases of massive pre-electoral fraud
and forging of Congolese nationality;
6. its favouritism in the granting of contracts;
7. its amateurism in electoral matters.
B. Proposal
With a view to guaranteeing the neutrality, the independence and the
impartiality that one has a right to expect from an neutral organizing
authority and to strengthen its institutional capacities, the UDPS
proposes:
1. the extension of the mandate of MONUC, involving in the organization
and supervision of the elections along side of Congolese social forces;
2. the concerted elaboration between the political class and MONUC of a
realistic electoral calendar.
3.3. Electoral Kits
A. Finding
The weaknesses of the working materials proposed by the Belgian company
ZETES PAS and that UDPS denounced at the time, are confirmed each day
through the operation of identification and the enrolment of
voters throughout the country. These mainly concern:
1. the insufficiency of the electoral kits delivered at too slow a
pace, in
violation of the market dispositions agreed in this regard, due to
the weakness of the financial backing of this enterprise
on the verge of bankruptcy in Belgium;
2. the near total lack of autonomy of these kits;
3. frequent and chronic breakdowns of generators;
4. the weakness of the system put in place incapable of
detecting multiple
individual registrations.
B. Proposal.
The UDPS makes the following proposals:
1. access of representatives of political parties to equal
treatment at the central level;
2. verification by a team of neutral experts of the
programs and software used in any equipment deployed
3. nationwide coverage by the enrolment process,
including extra-customary centres, because the national
voting population cannot be less than
30,000,000 for a population estimated at 60,000,000.
3.4. The census and identification of voters.
A. Finding
Not having begun with a census, as called for by the relevant legal
texts, all of the projections put forward by the ICE have become
illusory and therefore subject to discussion. Otherwise the
irresponsible way in which the process of identification and enrolment
of voters brushed aside and violated the pertinent
dispositions of the law on Congolese nationality can only lead to
disturbance. Briefly, the refusal to conduct a census of the
Congolese population permits the trading of national identities, the
enrolment of minors and men in uniform, in short, the programming
of
pre-electoral cheating on a grand scale.
B. Proposal
Given the known difficulties of proceeding with a scientific census, and
faced with the necessity of enumerating the population in order to
permit an objective determination of the electoral offices by
circumscription in accordance with their respective demographic
importance on one hand, and on the other, to put an end to the
trading of the Congolese national identity and to minimize fraud, UDPS
proposes:
1. an adapted administrative census using existing statistics such as
the
demographic data from religious communities, figures from four national
vaccination day assays, demographic data from titled officers of the
civil state:
leaders of avenues, streets and neighbourhoods, in cities, traditional
chiefs,
in other words, heads of sectors or “chefferies”, village chiefs and
groupements, in rural areas;
2. the use of statistics of the National Institute of Statistics and
results of administrative census data available since 2002;
3. resort to the High-Commission for Refugees to collect information
on
returning Congolese refugees and on foreign refugees living in Congo
that must be
quarantined during pre-electoral and electoral operations;
4. limit voting cards to electoral purposes rather than to make them
into identity cards, even on a provisional basis;
5. allow the legitimate right of Congolese living overseas, especially
in countries with a large concentration, to fulfill their civic
responsibility in their respective host countries.
3.5. Electoral Security.
A. Finding
Despite the official end of the war consecrated by the Cease-fire
Accord of Lusaka and the
Global and Inclusive Accord of Sun City, the Congolese people, and
particularly our compatriots of the Ituri, in the Orientale
province, of North and South Kivu , and those of Katanga, continue to
die in attacks by armed bands originating in the former
belligerent factions and the negative forces of foreign origin.
It is recognized then that the security situation in the DR Congo
is alarming
and poses a threat to the smooth functioning of the process due, in
part, to:
1. the persistence of factions of the ex-belligerents
and their allies and thus the absence of an integrated and
restructured republican army;
2. the persistence of corridors of tension maintained by
foreign rebel factions (FDLR, LRA...) operating
in DRC with the support of certain
Congolese actors known by the United
Nations to be guilty of arms trafficking in
the sub-region of the Great Lakes;
3. armed bands that continue to operate under the
cover of militias and
Mai-Mai, in Ituri, Kivu and in
4. The failure of the embargo on weapons with the DRC
as a destination
In this environment, the political parties of the democratic
opposition are
at a loss as to how to operate freely across the whole of DR Congo
and will
not be able, when the time comes, to campaign freely and in
security.
It is still to be feared that we will see electoral hold-ups in
the electoral circumscriptions believed to be favourable to
opposition as has happened
recently in
This fear is based in the fact that many battalions of the presidential
guard of the Head of State (GSSP), which are outside the control of
the Central Command of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of
Congo (AFDRC), have been deployed in all the provinces of the
country, where they are wreaking death, terror and desolation,
while they are supposed to be based in Kinshasa.
B. Proposal
With a view, on one hand, to assuring electoral security and to
permitting
all of the political parties to deploy and to move about without
being
disturbed and the population everywhere to fulfil its civic duty, and on
the other
to guarantee the security of political leaders of the unarmed
opposition,
UDPS proposes:
1. the
acceleration of the integration of the ex-belligerent factions including
the battalions of the presidential guard, with a view to the formation
of a restructured and integrated national army;
2. the incorporation of the ex-Faz in the process of
reintegration of the army, for their experience
and training must benefit the new army in reorganization;
3. the disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion of the militias
and other elements of the AFDRC who do not meet
established criteria and according to the size of this army
which must first be determined;
4. the organization, formation and deployment of the
electoral police force
which must depend on MONUC and not on the Ministry of
the Interior.
5 The restructuring of the security services so that
they will become republican, neutral, and
apolitical in service of the nation;
6. the cantonment and the disarmament of non-integrated
soldiers during
pre-electoral, electoral, and post-electoral operations.
ANNEX IV
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Finding
In RD Congo, all indicators of the human rights situation are flashing
red.
The 1+4 power in place, drawn from yesterday’s belligerents, can
only destroy or severely limit fundamental freedoms.
The public media of the State, which have the advantage of
covering the entire country, in particular the national radio and
television, are, in fact, controlled by only one political family
--the PPRD of Joseph KABILA.
At the time when we should be preparing to go to elections, the
ability to manoeuvre of the opposition political parties, and more
particularly that of the UDPS, is systematically curtailed.
Despite its undeniable national base, the UDPS is reduced to
barely functioning in
As an example, at the time of the opening of the ordinary session
of the National Committee (Parliament of the UDPS), in April 2005,
the UDPS was not authorized to meet in public buildings in the entire
city of
Everywhere in the interior of the country: in the districts,
territories, neighbourhoods, and village communities, politicized
provincial governments loyal to the regime in power are using any
kind of pretext, to prevent the activities of the party.
The members and leaders of the political parties of the
opposition, especially those of the Union for the Democracy and the
Social progress, UDPS, are killed, beaten, molested, imprisoned
for months and months without judgement or are sentenced because of
their political opinions. This is the case of a UDPS leader
from
1. Simon Kionga
2. Guy Guy Nzengele
3. Monda
4. Tresor ESWABO
5. TOTO
6. Fils MUKAMBALA
The UDPS is all the more disturbed that, in spite of assurances
received from MONUC, it has not succeeded in obtaining, as
promised, the release of its members arrested in
In addition, despite the timely intervention of MONUC, whose
mandate and operational capacity remain limited, the Congolese continue
to be victims of massacres, rapes, pillaging and destruction of
their belongings throughout the entire
Democratic Republic of Congo and particularly in the East of the country.
As we approach the announced end of the transition, juridical insecurity
is increasing throughout the national territory. This is not only
characterized by massive violations of human rights, but above all by
the impunity of the authors of these crimes and offences.
Thus, to cite only one recent case, during the month of October
2005 we witnessed incitement to tribal hatred, murder and
cannibalism launched on the airwaves of the radio and television by a
political party in KATANGA, without its leaders, who sit in national as
well as in provincial and local institutions, displaying any displeasure
whatsoever.
B. Proposal
The Union for Democracy and Social Progress:
1. urges the Security Council
through the Secretary-General of the UN to pressure the government
in place to release, without condition, all of these people;
2. requests the
United Nations to urgently order, the opening of a thorough
investigation and a legal proceeding, of the authors of the odious
massacres whose mass graves have just been discovered in North Kivu and
of all the other massacres, war crimes and crimes against humanity
perpetrated throughout the countries in the area by ex-belligerents;
3. calls for the de-politicization of the
public administration, in particular the provincial governments, as well
as the liberalization of the public media.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the international community is called on to take into
account the errors and the weaknesses which have marred and dragged down
the ongoing process, to encourage and support its requalification,
as the only way forward out of the crisis
The obstinate insistence, observed today, on defiantly pretending to
organize a semblance of an election for the sole purpose of justifying
the time and money already expended, seems to us a grave error,
the consequences of which are unimaginable.
As a consequence, the UDPS demands that the United Nations look reality
in the face and, inspired by its long experience world wide,
particularly in Mozambique, in Namibia, in Haiti, in Afghanistan, and
most recently in Ivory Coast, revisit the actual terms of its mandate in
Congo. It is in this way that all of the parties involved in
this process can use time most beneficially and validate the sacrifices
made so far by the international community.
In closing, UDPS thinks that the Sun City Accord, whose weaknesses led
us to the current impasse and the subsequent mandate of the United
Nations, which it resulted in, cannot by any pretext, not that of time,
nor that of financial engagement by the international community
already consented to, be considered unchangeable, at the risk of
condemning an entire people to missing its rendezvous with history in a
poorly organized election, the results of which risk plunging the
country into another far more severe crisis.
ETIENNE TSHISEKEDI wa MULUMBA
NATIONAL PRESIDENT
[translated from the original in French by Tshimanga John Metzel,